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Abstract 
We examine the impact of politically connected directors on accounting quality using a quasi 
experiment in China. In October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit government and party 
officials, who were concurrently holding public offices or had recently retired from such 
positions within the last three years, from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The 
regulation is part of China’s anti-corruption campaign, and it has led to a large number of 
politically connected directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 
18 has effectively weakened, if not fully discontinued, the political connections of the firms that 
previously hired government officials as directors. Our empirical analyses employ a difference-
in-differences research design with firm fixed effects to examine the pre- and post- period 
accounting quality around the enactment of Rule 18. We find that, compared to propensity-score-
matched control firms, the accounting quality of firms with politically connected directors 
increases after Rule 18, and that the effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises firms than 
for state-owned enterprises firms. We further examine the channels through which politically 
connected directors affect accounting quality. The evidence suggests that connected firms have 
better access to preferential financing and are under lax regulations, which reduce firms’ 
incentives to provide transparent information. 
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Do Politically Connected Directors Affect Accounting Quality?  
Evidence from China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (Rule 18) 
1. Introduction 
In November of 2012, Xi Jinping became the “paramount leader” of China (i.e., General 
Secretary; President; and Chairman of the Central Military Commission). Shortly after he took power, 
Xi launched a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign, vowing to maintain “zero-tolerance attitude 
toward corruption” and to “look into every case involving corruption.”1  As of 2016, more than 
100,000 people have been indicted for corruption, and 120 high-ranking officials, including five 
national-level leaders, have been targeted. The campaign has shown no sign of stopping yet, and is 
said to become the “new normal.”2  
As one important action of the anti-corruption campaign, the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
formally issued “Rule 18” on October 19, 2013.3 Realizing that the connections between business and 
government officials could foster corruption, the CPC mandates in Rule 18 that party and government 
officials above certain ranks, either currently in position or retired within three years, are prohibited 
from holding any part-time or full-time position in any enterprises. Rule 18 triggered an 
unprecedented large-scale resignation tide of politically connected directors among publicly listed 
firms.4 Because Rule 18 forced the politically connected directors to resign immediately, it led to a 
                                                 
1 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-07/01/content_25936928.htm 
2 See, for example, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-03/02/content_19695097.htm  
3 Rule 18 was issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC). The CPC has not 
only power over the government, but also over a variety of laws and regulations (Jones 2012). The CCCPC is responsible 
for promotions and demotions of all high-level officials, both in the government and in the CPC. Therefore, rules issued by 
CCCPC have very high authority. 
4 In our sample, a total of 819 directors resigned due to Rule 18, which affected 613 (or 29% of) listed nonfinancial firms. 
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loss of political connections for the firms that previously had political connections via these directors. 
In this paper, we utilize the issuance of Rule 18 as a quasi experiment to investigate the causal 
effect of politically connected directors on accounting quality.5 Politically connected directors can 
affect accounting quality in different directions. On one hand, because firms can establish political 
connections through their directors (hereafter, politically connected firms) to gain a variety of 
preferential treatments, such as preferential bank credit (e.g., Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008), 
favorable government contracts (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber 2001), and favorable court outcomes (e.g., 
Lu, Pan, and Zhang 2015), firms may have less incentive to provide transparent information. On the 
other hand, politically connected firms are subject to stricter media scrutiny; thus managers may have 
more incentive to be transparent in order to signal their commitment to investor protection (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983). 
Previous literature provides somewhat mixed evidence on the relation between political 
connections and accounting quality (see Section 2).6 We utilize Rule 18 and use a difference-in-
differences design with firm fixed effects to compare the effect of a loss of political connections on 
accounting quality for firms affected by Rule 18 to a propensity-score-matched (PSM) control group. 
                                                 
5 Although Rule 18 prohibits all positions in listed firms, most importantly the role as independent directors is affected 
because few officials serve full-time positions in listed firms. We examine all resignation announcements of top 
management during the sample period and don't notice that any full-time top managers (except for independent directors) 
resigned due to Rule 18.  
6 Also important, previous studies focus on the cross-sectional relation between political connections and accounting 
quality. Because firms strategically choose whether to develop their political connections, studies based on association 
tests are inherently subject to endogeneity problems such as reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Not only can 
political connections affect accounting quality, accounting quality may also affect political connections. For example, 
firms with lower transparency may choose to establish political connections, leading to a negative relation. Another 
endogeneity problem is the correlated omitted variables problem, where some firm characteristics affect accounting quality 
and political connections at the same time. For example, low-quality corporate governance may affect both at the same 
time. 
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We find that firms that lose politically connected directors experience a significant improvement in 
accounting quality (proxied by accruals quality in our primary tests; buttressed with model-free 
proxies in additional analyses) after the enactment of Rule 18 compared to the control firms. The 
results suggest that politically connected directors have a negative impact on accounting quality, so 
the accounting quality increases when they resign. Importantly, the results suggest a causal effect of 
political connections on accounting quality. We also find that the effects are stronger for non-state-
owned firms than for state-owned firms (SOEs), suggesting that political connections through 
directors are more important for non-SOEs.  
We further perform several cross-sectional analyses to investigate the channels through which 
politically connected directors affect accounting quality. First, firms may receive preferential access to 
bank credit through their political connections (Claessens et al. 2008), and if so, firms with politically 
connected directors have less incentive to provide transparent financial information to investors. 
However, after the resignations of politically connected directors, firms are likely to face greater 
difficulty in obtaining financing due to their weakened or ceased political ties; thus, they may increase 
accounting quality to ensure better access to capital markets. We execute two cross-sectional analyses 
to test this hypothesis. Because firms that receive preferential treatment in terms of bank credit have 
lower cost of debt, we split the sample based on the cost of debt in the pre-event period. We find that 
the increase in financial reporting quality is stronger in the subsample of firms with lower cost of debt, 
which is consistent with our hypothesis. In addition, politically connected firms have preferential 
access to domestic banks, so they are less likely to seek foreign capital before the connections are 
discontinued (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006). However, after the political connections have ceased, 
they may want to provide more transparent information to gain better access to foreign capital. The 
 4 
 
results show that the increase in accounting quality is stronger when foreign capital plays a more 
important role. Taken together, the evidence suggests that politically connected directors grant firms 
preferential access to financing, which reduces management’s incentive to provide high-quality 
financial reports.  
Further, political connections result in lax enforcement of regulations and lower (or fewer) 
penalties if a misconduct is detected (e.g., Berkman, Cole, and Fu 2010; Yu and Yu 2011). After the 
loss of political connections, firms face stricter regulations, so they may be more likely to improve 
accounting quality. To test this hypothesis, we conduct two cross-sectional analyses. In the first 
analysis, we partition the sample based on the efficiency of the judiciary system in China. An efficient 
judiciary system imposes real costs and penalties on firms’ misconduct, so firms are more likely to 
increase accounting quality to avoid these costs after losing their political protection via the politically 
connected directors. We find that the effect is stronger in the subsample with a more efficient 
judiciary system. The second analysis shows that the increase in accounting quality is stronger in the 
subsample of small firms. We argue that this finding is due to political connections being more 
effective in protecting small firms that are less scrutinized by the public media than large firms. Also, 
small firms are more vulnerable to legal costs (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004). Collectively, the 
evidence suggests that lax regulations and lower penalties are other channels for politically connected 
directors to affect accounting quality.  
We conduct several robustness tests to further validate our findings. First, we manually collect 
detailed data on personal characteristics and professional backgrounds of both the resigned politically 
connected directors and the successor directors. We control for these characteristics and no 
conclusions are altered. 
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Next, Rule 18 affects another group of directors who have no political connections in substance - 
university professors, leaders in publicly-funded organizations, and senior managers in SOEs. 
Although these individuals have official ranks, they do not have substantial political influence either 
in the government or the party, so we expect their resignations not to affect accounting quality. 
Consistent with this expectation, we do not find a significant change in the accounting quality for such 
firms. 
Third, other events that occurred during this period in China could potentially confound our 
results. Because our research design controls for the time trend in accounting quality, only events that 
would systematically affect the treatment and control firms could affect our inferences. We consider 
two events that could possibly have different effects on the treatment and control firms. First, we 
examine whether the reduction of entertainment costs due to the “Eight-Point Regulation” in 2012 
(another example of the government’s anti-corruption efforts) drives the results. Second, we examine 
whether the market-liberalization reform of 2015 affects our conclusions. Our conclusions are not 
impacted in these robustness tests. 
To address the possibility that unobservable factors other than Rule 18 could drive our results, 
we conduct a placebo test using a “pseudo-event” year. We do not find significant differences in 
accounting quality between treatment and control firms around this pseudo-event. Finally, to assess 
the sensitivity of our findings to our proxy for accounting quality we use three alternative measures 
and inferences are unaffected. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the large scale of the anti-
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corruption campaign has attracted intensive interest from the press and academia. 7  For example, 
Griffin, Liu, and Shu (2016) and Lin, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2016) examine the effect of the Eight-
Point Regulation. They document positive market reactions, a reduction in entertainment expenses, 
and an increase in firm performance associated with the policy. Ke, Liu, and Tang (2016) find that the 
anti-corruption campaign reduces the luxury-goods consumption of SOE firms. We examine another 
important policy during the anti-corruption campaign, Rule 18. Rule 18 focuses on government 
officials who take positions in listed companies. Our article is among the first to investigate the effects 
of the anti-corruption campaign in general, and it is the first paper that examines the impact of Rule 18 
on accounting quality. 
Second, our study establishes a causal effect of politically connected directors on accounting 
quality. While previous literature provides some evidence in other settings that political connections 
can bring value to firms, our findings suggest a negative effect of having political ties on firms’ 
financial reporting quality; that is, the ceasing of political ties via the political connected directors 
improves firms’ accounting quality. Further, firms strategically develop their political connections, so 
endogeneity issues are an important concern to understand the relation between political connections 
and accounting quality. We utilize an economically important regulatory change to establish a causal 
link between firms’ political connections and their accounting quality. 
 Third, this article sheds light on the channels through which politically connected directors 
affect accounting quality. We test two non-exclusive channels: reduced financing pressures and lax 
                                                 
7  See, for example, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21654664-many-wonder-what-xi-jinping-plans-next-his-anti-
corruption-drive-after-zhou-who; http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2014/06/05/the-price-of-fighting-corruption-
in-china/#11f167065039.  
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regulation. Our results support effects through both channels. That is, politically connected directors 
provide firms better access to preferential financing resources and better protection against strict 
regulations; as such, politically connected firms have less incentive to provide high-quality 
information to investors and regulators.  
Fourth, previous literature only identifies political connections with high-level politicians, such 
as prime ministers or members of parliament (e.g., Faccio 2006; Chaney et al. 2011, Guedhami et al. 
2014). Faccio (2006) suggests that firms’ connections with local officials may be more important than 
their connections with high-level government officeholders. In particular, high-level government 
officeholders may not fully capture the total effect of political connections, and inferences cannot be 
easily generalizable to lower-level connections.8 Our paper fills in the gap by identifying political 
connections with lower level officials, as such, it extends previous studies and provides a more 
complete assessment of the impact of political connections on accounting quality. 
 
2. Institutional Background, Prior Research, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Although China has grown to become the second-largest economy in the world, it has distinctive 
characteristics that differentiate it from western countries. Two features are especially relevant to our 
study. The first is the central role of the government in the economy. The government directly controls 
a large group of enterprises as well as the financial market. More generally, the government has a 
                                                 
8 Among the 47 countries in Faccio (2006), only nine countries have more than ten firms with political connections; 30 
countries have fewer than five firms with connections. Chaney et al. (2011) and Guedhami et al. (2015) use the same 
sample as Faccio (2006). 
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particularly significant role in allocating scarce resources, and it can intervene in judicial and 
regulatory decisions at its discretion. While the Chinese capital market has grown rapidly in the last 
25 years, the regulatory regime has not kept pace with the developments in the financial market. China 
still has a weak legal system and inadequate investor protection (e.g., Piotroski and Wong 2012). 
The other distinctive feature of China is a heavy emphasis on relationship-management in the 
economy. It is commonly believed that relationships (or social networks) - Guanxi - serve as 
substitutes for formal institutional development or formal contracts in the course of business (Gold 
and Guthrie, 2002). Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) document that Chinese firms rely on relationships or 
informal channels to access various resources.  
Based on the above two features, it is not surprising that firms in China attempt to establish 
political connections with officials or political leaders (Fan, Wong, and Zhang 2007; Hung, Wong, 
and Zhang 2012). One important phenomenon is that publicly listed firms hire government officials 
and just-retired officials as directors. In our sample, about 15 percent of the listed firms had hired 
officials as independent directors prior to Rule 18. The close relationships between the listed firms and 
the government officials can bring various preferential treatments for the firms (Li, Meng, and Wang, 
2008), but they can also lead to corruption of government officials. 
After Jinping Xi became the President of China and General Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party in 2012, he launched a large-scale anti-corruption campaign. This campaign has 
investigated and removed five national-level leaders and hundreds of high-ranking party or 
government officials. As one of the more significant measures, the Organization Department of the 
CCCPC released “Rule 18” on October 19, 2013 with a formal title of “To further regulate the 
officials who take positions in enterprises.” The purpose of Rule 18 is said to “enforce strict 
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requirements with cadre” and “to fight against corruption.” This regulation forbids all party and 
government officials above certain ranks from taking any position in enterprises on either a part-time 
or a full-time basis. The policy has a direct impact on listed firms and triggered a large-scale 
resignation tide of politically connected independent directors.9 
Rule 18 provides a useful setting to study the causal effect of political connections on firms’ 
accounting quality. First, it is an exogenous event (at least at the firm level) that forced hundreds of 
directors to resign from listed firms. The political connections through those directors are therefore cut 
off, or at least weakened significantly, after the resignations. Previous studies utilize sudden deaths to 
investigate the value of independent directors or political connections (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Nguyen 
and Nielsen 2010; Faccio and Parsley 2009). Although those are interesting and exogenous events, the 
samples are usually very small and more importantly, their research questions are not about 
accounting quality.10  In contrast, Rule 18 caused a large number of director resignations due to 
explicit and exogenous reasons, and we use the event to examine the effects of political connections 
on accounting quality. 
Second, this context provides an effective way to identify political connections. We thus extend 
previous studies that use different measures for political connections. For example, Faccio and Parsley 
(2009) use geographic proximity to politicians, and Yu and Yu (2011) employ firms’ lobbying 
                                                 
9  See press reports about the resignation tide at http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20140307/015318431403.shtml, 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/06-03/6238320.shtml, http://finance.people.com.cn/money/n/2014/0423/c42877-
24930194.html. Liu, Lin, and Wu (2016) find significant market reactions to the announcement of Rule 18. 
10 Fisman (2001) documents that the death of Suharto leads to negative market reactions to firms connected to Suharto’s 
family, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) document negative market reactions to sudden deaths of independent directors, 
suggesting independent directors have value, Faccio and Parsley (2009) use geographic closeness to measure political 
connection, and examine the market reaction to politically connected firms around the death of politicians. None of these 
studies examine the effects on accounting quality. 
 10 
 
activities as proxies. These measures are likely noisier measures of political connections than directors 
with a direct connection to the government. Rule 18 is an exogenous event and as such allows us to 
better measure the politically connected directors. Because these connected directors are forced to 
resign in a short period and these resignations need to be publicly disclosed, we can manually verify 
the reasons for the resignations.11 
Third, existing studies often employ cross-country data, which raise concerns regarding 
endogeneity, the availability of variables at the country level, noisy variables, and the possibility of 
correlated omitted variables (Miller 2004). Cross-country studies are also affected by differences in 
legal, judicial, and cultural factors, which make it hard to disentangle firm-level effects from country-
level factors (Gul 2006). The different disclosure regulations across countries further add noise to the 
data (Faccio 2016). Because we focus on a large sample of firms in one particular country, these 
concerns are mitigated in our setting. 
Finally, China is an ideal environment to study the effect of political connections. As Agrawal 
and Knoeber (2001) articulate, the effect of political connections on firm behaviors is likely to be the 
most significant when regulations and government controls have important consequences for the 
corporate sector. Faccio (2006; 2010) shows that political connections have a larger effect in a weak 
institutional environment with a higher level of corruption and lower transparency. China is the largest 
emerging country with all these characteristics and it provides a large sample and an exogenous event 
for our study. 
   
                                                 
11 Note that our study focuses on one specific type of political connections: through politically connected directors. There 
could be other types of political connections that we cannot explicitly measure. 
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2.2 Prior Research 
Political connections are a widespread phenomenon around the world.12 Firms establish political 
connections to achieve a variety of preferential treatments. For example, Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven (2008) find that political connections increase firms’ access to credit through bank financing. 
Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2010) examine the effects of regulations aimed at improving corporate 
governance. They show that although these regulations generally increase firm value, the effect is 
weaker for firms with stronger ties to government regulators (i.e., officials shield the companies from 
enforcement of the new rules). In a similar vein, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) document that politically 
connected firms are more likely to be funded when firms apply for the Troubled Asset-Relief Program. 
More closely related to our study, researchers have also examined the effect of political 
connections on accounting quality. Using an international dataset on corporate political connections 
developed by Faccio (2006), Chaney et al. (2011) conclude that the presence of connections is 
associated with lower quality accounting. Guedhami et al. (2014) use the same database and examine 
the auditor choice of politically connected firms. Guedhami et al. (2014, 108) argue that “connected 
insiders who refrain from self-dealing would prefer higher-quality financial reporting” so as to 
convince outside investors that they will not divert corporate resources. Consistent with their 
argument, they find that firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big-4 auditor. 
Although the above two papers focus on different research questions and use different dependent 
variables, the basic concept under investigation is the relation between political connections and 
                                                 
12 As Faccio (2006) shows, political connections exist in 35 of her 47 sample countries. In addition, connected firms 
account for about 8% of the world’s stock-market capitalization. These facts suggest that politically connected firms are a 
significant group of firms and that the issue we examine is of general interest. 
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accounting quality. Chaney et al. (2011) suggest a negative relation whereas Guedhami et al. (2014) 
conclude that connected firms are more likely to hire Big-4 auditors, and that connected firms with 
Big-4 auditors exhibit less earnings management. 
Because firms strategically choose to establish political connections, there is an inherent 
endogeneity problem between accounting quality and such connections, which is difficult to tackle 
using cross-sectional analyses.13 Our research design utilizes a quasi-experimental setting with firm 
fixed effects and PSM.14 
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Ex ante, it is not clear whether political connections have a negative or positive effect on 
accounting quality. Such connections may negatively affect accounting quality for the following 
reasons. First, politically connected firms establish connections to derive gains from their connections, 
and these gains are often in the gray area or of dubious legality (Fisman 2001). Therefore, insiders 
may want to obscure reported earnings in order to obfuscate the gains from those connections.15 
                                                 
13 Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) use the demise of Suharto as an exogenous event and find firms are more likely to 
obtain access to foreign capital after the loss of political connection. However, they do not focus on accounting quality.  
14 Our research also relates to the literature on the role of independent directors. Previous studies suggest that independent 
directors play a role in the monitoring of management. For example, Weisbach (1988) finds that the existence of 
independent directors increases the likelihood of firing CEOs for poor performance. Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) 
investigate the market reactions to the sudden deaths of independent directors and find that the market perceives 
independent directors as valuable. Their further investigation indicates that the value of independent directors is 
incremental to their individual skills or competence. Armstrong, Core, and Guay (2014) document that corporate 
transparency generally improves following a required increase in the proportion of independent directors. Similarly, Wang, 
Xie, and Zhu (2015) show that independent directors with industry expertise are more effective in monitoring managers. 
15  Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) argue that firms with political connections dislike high transparency, as such 
transparency will expose political favors with dubious legality. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that firms 
with political connections are less likely to access global financing to avoid the scrutiny of foreign security markets. 
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Second, transparent financial information is fundamental to the development of financial 
markets. External investors demand transparent information when providing capital. Because 
connected firms gain access to preferential financing, they may attach lower importance to external 
investors. As a result, they have reduced incentives to improve the quality of the information they 
disclose, so managers invest less time to accurately portray accounting quality (Chaney et al. 2011). 
Third, politically connected firms not only enjoy the benefits of political connections, but also 
carry some political burdens. For example, Piotroski et al. (2015) indicate that Chinese politicians 
prefer to suppress negative information during specific time periods, such as elections or political 
events. They find that politically connected firms in China suppress negative information in order to 
cater to the political needs of politicians. Therefore, the information of politically connected firms can 
be distorted by political needs (and thus the quality of the information provided is reduced). 
Finally, regulators require firms to provide high-quality information, and they penalize firms that 
fail to follow rules. However, prior literature shows that the regulatory monitoring is less severe for 
politically connected firms. Yu and Yu (2011) find that politically connected firms are significantly 
less likely to be detected for fraud. Therefore, the relatively lax regulatory environment for the 
politically connected firms reduces the regulatory motivation for them to provide high-quality 
information. 
On the other hand, according to the political-cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1978), 
politically connected firms are more publicly visible and are subject to greater media scrutiny. When 
officials take positions in public firms, this information must be disclosed to the public, which could 
amplify the attention from media. The possibility of and thus the expected cost of the media and other 
public-watchdog organizations (and others who rely on the media for information) detecting earnings 
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manipulations are both higher. Li and Shen (2010) find that in China negative media coverage triggers 
further investigation by the government, and that the affected officials are more likely to lose positions 
or their promotion opportunity. Therefore, politically connected firms may have incentives to provide 
high-quality information. 
Second, politically connected firms may have easier access to subsidized financing or 
government contracts. For example, Claessens et al. (2008) find that Brazilian firms that provide 
contributions to elected federal deputies significantly increase their access to bank financing. Piotroski 
and Wong (2012) conclude that Chinese firms with political connections are treated favorably when 
they access the capital market. Because capital-market pressures and fierce competition can cause 
managers to manipulate earnings, the preferential treatment may blunt incentives to manipulate 
earnings for capital-market and contracting purposes, suggesting a positive relation between political 
connections and earnings quality (Gul 2006). Aharony, Lee, and Wong (2000) argue that Chinese 
SOEs in protected industries are more likely to have political connections and receive preferential 
treatments. They find empirical evidence that these firms are less likely to manage earnings during the 
IPO process. 
Third, independent directors have incentives to develop their reputations (Fama and Jensen 
1983). Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2016) provide evidence that independent directors in China care about 
their reputations, and that reputation concerns affect their voting behaviors. Finally, prior literature 
shows that politically connected firms are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders. Faccio 
(2006) finds evidence that outside investors perceive that controlling shareholders with political 
connections exploit these connections for their own benefits (while harming other owners). Given that 
outside investors prefer transparent information as a protection, Guedhami et al. (2014) argue that 
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insiders, who refrain from self-dealing, could provide higher quality financial reporting to signal to 
outside investors. 
Taken together, the effect of politically connected directors on firms’ accounting quality is not 
clear. In addition, accounting quality may affect the establishment of political connections. For 
example, opaque firms may establish connections in order to receive preferential treatments. Because 
of these empirical challenges, we believe that the nature of Rule 18 and the differences-in-differences 
methodology are especially useful in establishing the effect of politically connected directors on 
accounting quality. The resignation of politically connected directors due to Rule 18 effectively severs 
the political connections between the firm and politicians. To summarize, by observing the change of 
accounting quality around Rule 18, we can identify the causal effect of these connections. Our 
primary hypothesis is stated as follows in the null form: 
 
H1: The accounting quality of firms with politically connected directors does not change after 
the enactment of Rule 18. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We start our sample with all firms listed on the Main and SME boards of China’s stock 
markets.16 To identify the treated firms, we hand collect all resignation announcements of directors 
                                                 
16 Our sample does not include firms listed on ChiNext, which is established to attract small, innovative, and fast-growing 
enterprises, especially high-tech firms. The listing standards of ChiNext are less stringent than those of the Main and SME 
Boards. 
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after Rule 18, which was released on October 19, 2013.17 Many resignation announcements explicitly 
state that the director has to resign from the firm to comply with Rule 18. However, some firms tend 
to blur the true reason by providing ambiguous statements such as “due to personal reasons.” To 
mitigate any possible omissions for announcements without explicit explanations, we check the 
background of the resigned directors to identify whether the director is affected by Rule 18. The 
background information is retrieved from each director’s resume obtained from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and supplemented from companies’ home pages 
or other websites.18 Because university professors, leaders in publicly-funded organizations, and top 
managers in SOEs in China have similar civil-service ranks as government officials, they were also 
affected by Rule 18 and were forced to resign.19 To assure that the resigned directors represent the loss 
of political connections, we exclude these cases from the treatment sample.20 All other firms are 
control firms in the difference-in-differences (DiD) regression when employing the full sample, and as 
candidates as matching firms for tests using PSM.  
To examine the effects of political connections, we collect financial information for the two 
years before and two years after Rule 18. Specifically, since Rule 18 was released in October 2013, 
                                                 
17 Almost all official directors announced their resignations before the issuance of 2014 annual reports. Therefore, we 
collect resignation announcements from the introduction of Rule 18 until April 30, 2015, the mandatory deadline for 2014 
annual reports.  
18  For example, www.baidu.com, http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com, http://stock.jrj.com.cn, http://finance.sina.com.cn, 
http://www.stockstar.com, and http://www.10jqka.com.cn. 
19 Based on a practice that has been followed for several decades, universities, publicly-funded organizations, and SOEs 
are given civil-service ranks equal to those of government departments. For example, prestigious universities usually have 
a civil-service rank of vice-ministerial level, and the leaders of those universities have the civil-service ranks similar to 
vice-minister. Publicly-funded organizations are mostly nonprofit organizations, such as the Chinese Academy of Science, 
General Research Institution for Nonferrous Metals, etc. 
20 In a robustness test, we separately test the effects of resigned directors in this subsample and find no significant change 
of accounting quality. 
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we use 2012 and 2013 as the pre-rule period, while 2014 and 2015 comprise the post-rule period.21  
Financial information is obtained from CSMAR. Following prior literature, we exclude financial 
firms because computing discretionary accruals for these firms is problematic. We also eliminate 
firms with missing data or negative equity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles in order to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
Our main tests involve DiD analyses using a PSM control group. This methodology compares 
the accounting quality of a sample of treatment firms with politically connected directors who have 
resigned to that of control firms (without resigned directors but otherwise comparable), before and 
after the Rule 18 - induced director resignations.  
The DiD approach has several advantages. First, this methodology controls for omitted trends 
that are correlated with accounting quality in both the treatment and the control groups.22 With the 
development of the stock market and the improvement of regulation, Chinese firms may have 
improved corporate governance and accounting quality over time (Jiang, Lee, and Yue 2010). Second, 
the tests are conducted surrounding policy changes that cause a change in political connections. This 
helps to rule out reverse-causality concerns, such as firms with lower accounting quality choosing to 
                                                 
21 The policy is issued at the end of 2013, so nearly all affected independent directors began to resign from 2014. Therefore 
we classify 2013 as pre-policy period. Our inferences are not affected if we exclude 2013 from our sample period or 
employ 2011 and 2012 as the pre-rule period. We also employ a specification that includes four years as pre-rule period 
(i.e. 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 as the pre-rule period, and 2014 and 2015 as the post-rule period). Inferences are not 
affected (untabulated). 
22 We observe that the two groups of firms exhibit similar trends in accounting quality in the four years prior to the reform 
(untabulated). 
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establish connections. In addition, we include either industry or firm fixed effects in the regressions. 
Firm fixed effects control for any time-invariant unobserved differences between the treatment and the 
control groups. For example, corporate governance could be correlated with both political connections 
and accounting quality, and may lead to spurious correlations between them. 
The PSM approach generates samples in which treatment firms and control firms are more 
similar, which helps mitigate the possibility that omitted correlated variables are driving our results 
(e.g., Hope, Thomas, and Vyas 2013). To implement this PSM approach, we first estimate a logit 
regression using the information in the year 2013 to model the probability of being affected by Rule 
18 (i.e., whether a particular firm has affected directors). Similar to the study of DeFond, Hung, Li, 
and Li (2014), we include all independent variables in equation (1) in the PSM model to assure that all 
known factors that may potentially affect accounting quality are similar across the treatment and 
control samples. The estimation results of the logit model are presented in Appendix A. Next, we 
calculate the propensity score for each firm using the predicted probabilities from the logit model, and 
match each treatment firm to the control firm using the nearest-neighborhood technique without 
replacement. 
We compare the changes in accounting quality among connected firms with non-politically 
connected firms over the period 2012-2015. In order to perform this comparison, we regress our 
accounting quality measures on 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 that captures the interaction between political 
connections (boards with official directors) and the post-policy period, along with a set of control 
variables. The main regression model is as follows: 
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|DA|𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 × 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛾 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 (1) 
where |DA|it is our primary measure of accounting quality, the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals for firm i in year t. We use Kothari, Leone, and Wasley’s (2005) cross-sectional 
performance-adjusted model that partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions 
that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time (Kasznik 1999; DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994).23 Higher absolute values of discretionary accruals indicate lower accounting 
quality. 
OFFICIAL is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with resigned official 
directors, and zero otherwise. POST is defined as one when the year is after the issuance of Rule 18, 
(i.e., 2014 or 2015), and zero otherwise.  
To purge the effect of underlying business processes and other fundamental drivers of the 
accruals quality, we include several control variables that the literature has shown to associate with 
firms’ accounting quality (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Daniel, Denis, and Naveen 2008; Hribar 
and Nichol, 2007; Raman and Shahrur 2008; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012): firm size (SIZE), 
                                                 
23 Specifically, we estimate the following model each year using all firm-year observations for each industry: 
Acc𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2(∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
where Accit is the total accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary items minus total cash flow from operation, 
scaled by lagged total assets; Assetsit-1 is the lagged total assets; ΔSaleit is change in sales; ΔARit is change in account 
receivable; PPEit is property, plant, and equipment, and ROAit is current return on asset, all scaled using lagged total assets. 
We use total assets as the deflator to mitigate heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Industry is defined by China Security 
Regulatory Commission (21 different industries). The residuals from the regressions are then used to measure 
discretionary accruals. 
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leverage (LEV), operating cycle (CYCLE), volatility of the operating environment (SDSALES; the 
volatility of sales), capital intensity (PPE), dividend payments (DIVIDEND), and firm age (AGE). 
Next, we include a set of variables to control for corporate governance. Specifically, we 
incorporate managers’ ownership (INSIDER), board size (BOARDSIZE), the percentage of 
independent directors (INDPRO), analyst following (ANALYSTS), auditor quality (BIG4), and audit 
fees (AF) in our model.24 
Previous research indicates that firm growth and firm performance affect accruals quality (e.g., 
Kasznik 1999; Lee, Li, and Yue 2004). Therefore we include return on assets (ROA), an indicator 
variable indicating negative earnings (LOSS), annual stock returns (RETURN), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), and annual sales growth (GROWTH). Given that our setting is China, we additionally follow 
Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) and include an indicator variable for whether the firm is a state-
owned enterprise (SOE) as well as the marketization index for each province or provincial region 
(MI).25 Consistent with Chen et al. (2011), we also control for stock beta (BETA). 
Finally, we include year fixed effects and either industry or firm fixed effects.26 We cluster 
standard errors at the firm level to mitigate the overstatement of statistical significance owing to serial 
correlation in the error term (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
The major variable of interest is the interaction between political connection and post-period 
                                                 
24 Igan and Pinheiro (2004) show that insider ownership affects the decision to manage earnings. Klein (2002) suggests 
that board characteristics are related to the effectiveness in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. Yu 
(2008) finds that analysts play a monitoring role on earnings management. Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) observe 
an association between auditor characteristics and earnings management. 
25 The marketization index is produced by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI), with higher scores indicating 
that the market plays a more important role in the economy (Fan, Wang, and Zhu 2011). 
26 When firm fixed effects are included, the variable OFFICIAL drops out. 
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(𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡). The coefficient on the interaction term, 𝛽1, captures the incremental change 
in accounting quality from the pre- to the post- period for firms with resigned official directors relative 
to the change for firms in the benchmark group. A negative (positive) coefficient on 𝛽1 is consistent 
with a decrease (increase) in absolute discretionary accruals, which indicates that the cutting-off of 
connections improves (impairs) accounting quality. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The Influence of Rule 18 
Table 1 presents the sample-selection procedure. We start from all firms listed on both the Main 
and SME boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We have 2,090 listed firms with a 
total of 8,337 directors on the date when Rule 18 was issued. Among those listed firms and directors, 
819 directors were forced to resign after Rule 18, which affects a total of 613 firms (or 29% of the 
whole population of listed non-financial firms). It is evident that Rule 18 had a highly significant 
impact on the directors and publicly traded companies. We further remove observations if resigned 
directors are not government or party officials. As explained, these directors are university professors, 
leaders in publicly-funded organizations, or SOE managers. They have similar civil-service ranks as 
officials but are considerably less likely to provide political connections for firms. This leaves us with 
315 firms. After eliminating firms with missing variables or without appropriate PSM matching firms, 
our final treated group includes 292 firms with 377 resigned official directors. 
The large sample of resigned official directors indicates that listed firms in China were keen to 
hire officials as directors in order to build up political connections. This is consistent with previous 
evidence that firms tend to establish such connections, especially in regions where the government 
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plays an important role (e.g., Korn/Ferry 2000; Hillman 2005). The large-scale resignation wave due 
to this event provides us with an ideal setting to study the effect of political connections on accounting 
quality. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our main variables separately in the 
treatment group, non-treatment group, and PSM control group prior to the event. We observe that the 
treatment and non-treatment firms have significant differences in many firm characteristics. 
Specifically, relative to the control group, treatment firms are larger, have lower market-to-book ratio, 
are more likely to be SOEs, are older, have a larger board of directors, pay higher audit fees, and are 
located in regions with a lower level of marketization. These differences suggest the necessity to 
employ PSM.  
Importantly, after we use PSM to identify the control sample, all significant differences are 
eliminated. We also evaluate the effectiveness of PSM by examining whether the covariates are 
balanced across treatment and control group. In untabulated analyses, we find that the mean bias drops 
significantly from 10.1% before matching to 4.5% after matching. Thus, the PSM approach is 
effective in removing meaningful differences in the matched variables across the treatment and 
control groups. 
In Panel B of Table 2 we present firm characteristics for the main sample in our regression tests. 
There are 2,204 firm-year observations for a total of 584 firms. 
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4.3 Political Connections and Accounting Quality 
Table 3 provides our main results of the impact of political connections on accounting quality. In 
columns (1) and (2), we use all other firms as control firms, and use industry fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects, respectively. The estimated coefficients on β1( 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡) are -0.0135 and -
0.0130 respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level (using two-sided tests). In models (3) and 
(4), we use PSM firms as control firms, and again use industry fixed effects and firm fixed effects, 
respectively. The coefficients for the test variable are -0.0198 and -0.0199, respectively (significant at 
the1% level). The results from the two sets of regressions are consistent, and the coefficients using the 
PSM sample are even larger in magnitude. The evidence indicates that firms improve the accounting 
quality when their official directors resign, suggesting political connections impair accounting quality. 
Our results establish a causal relation between such connections and accounting quality. 
Because the PSM procedure generates control firms similar to treatment firms, it mitigates the 
effects of possible omitted variables. We therefore use PSM in the following analyses. The ownership 
type of firms may influence the effects of connections on accounting quality. Listed firms with the 
government as the ultimate largest shareholders are generally carved out from large state-owned 
economic groups, and may have political connections by nature. They often receive preferential 
treatments from banks and government regulations and take social-policy burdens (Lu et al. 2015; 
Park and Luo 2001). Therefore, SOEs may not need to depend on official directors for political 
connections, and the resignations of official directors are expected to have less effect. We divide the 
full sample based on whether the government or its agent is the firm’s ultimate controller (SOEs) or 
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not, and redo the analysis.27 Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 present the results. As we can see, 
𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡  is significant in both the non-SOE group (-0.0297) and the SOE group (-
0.0112). More importantly, the magnitude of  β1in the non-SOE group is larger than that in the SOE 
group (and the difference is statistically significant), suggesting that the effect of politically connected 
directors is more important for non-SOE firms. 
 
4.4 Channel Analysis: Lower Financing Pressure 
To further understand how political connections affect accounting quality, we examine two 
potential channels. First, political connections may affect accounting quality due to financing 
pressures. As discussed, politically connected firms receive preferential treatments in terms of 
financing. For example, Claessens et al. (2008) find that firms with political connections have more 
access to bank financing. Piotroski and Zhang (2014) show that in China political intervention plays a 
significant role in the IPO process, and that firms gain access to stock-market financing through their 
connections. Yu, Wang, and Jin (2012) find that political connections can mitigate financial 
constraints, especially for non-SOEs. They suggest that political connections bring more resources for 
those firms. Piotroski and Wong (2012) conclude that Chinese firms with political connections are 
treated favorably when they access the capital market. Therefore, when firms have preferential 
treatments in the access to external financing, they do not face the same level of pressure from 
external investors who usually require transparent disclosure. In contrast, when the political 
connections are cut off, firms are forced to increase accounting quality. 
                                                 
27 We compare across the partitions because this approach allows the coefficients on the control variables to vary across the 
partitions (Covrig, DeFond, and Hung 2007). 
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To test the financing-pressure channel, we use two conditioning variables. The first is a firm-
level variable, the cost of debt before the event. Following Pittman and Fortin (2004), we calculate the 
cost of debt as interest expense divided by the amount of interest-bearing debt. When the cost of debt 
is lower, firms are more likely to receive preferential credit, therefore, after the political connection is 
severed, they will face greater pressure from external investors. Recall that we employ PSM in these 
analyses. 
The other variable is a region-level variable - the degree to which foreign capital is used in the 
province. Foreign investors are more likely to require high-quality information compared with local 
banks that are usually controlled by the government. Before the event, firms with political connections 
can more easily depend on local banks and do not need financing from foreign capital, however, Rule 
18 cuts off the connections and these firms are more likely to have to face foreign investors. Therefore, 
for firms in regions in which foreign capital is more important, the increase of pressure from financing 
due to loss of political connections is larger, and firms are more likely to increase accounting 
quality.28 
We partition our sample into two subsamples based on the (median) cost of debt or the index for 
the foreign-capital importation, respectively. We then rerun the regression and compare the 
coefficients on 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 between two subsamples. Panel A of Table 4 reports the results 
of partition analysis based on the cost of debt. β1 is significantly negative in both groups, and the 
magnitude of the coefficient is significantly larger in the group with lower cost of debt than that in the 
                                                 
28 To be precise, before Rule 18, firms with political connections will not care (or will care much less) about accounting 
quality no matter whether the importance of foreign capital is high or low, because these firms obtain financing regardless.  
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group with higher cost of debt.29 These results indicate that firms with lower cost of debt before the 
policy have the motivation to satisfy the higher demand of external investors for accounting quality.30  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of partition analysis based on the degree of foreign-
capital importation. We use the index compiled by Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011), with a high index 
value indicating the larger involvement of foreign capital in the province. We partition the sample 
based on the median. The results indicate that the test variable is significant in both subsamples. More 
importantly, the magnitude of the coefficient in the group with more foreign capital involved is 
significantly larger than that in the other group.31 
Together, these results provide support for the financing-pressure channel. When firms receive 
more preferential treatment in terms of credit before the event, or when foreign capital plays a greater 
role, the severing of political connections is more likely to increase the pressure from the capital 
market for those firms. Therefore, these firms increase their accounting quality more. 
 
                                                 
29 We alternatively group firms based on the median of the treatment firms and then put the matching firms in the same 
group. Inferences are unchanged. 
30 In an untabulated analysis, we divide the sample into two groups according to whether short-term debt deflated by total 
debt is higher than the median. Firms with higher ratio face re-financing pressure in the near future, therefore the financing 
pressure induced by the cut-off of political connections is stronger. We find that the effects of politically connected 
directors are more significant in this group. 
31 As an alternative and untabulated test, we consider Fan, Wang, and Zhu’s (2011) financial-market marketization index 
that consists of two parts: (1) The market share of non-state-owned banks and (2) the percentage of loans given to non-
SOEs. Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2010) find that non-state-owned banks care more about quality accounting and firms 
that borrow from non-state-owned banks have more conservative accounting. Before the event, firms with political 
connections can more easily depend on state-owned banks and do not need financing from non-state-owned banks, 
however, Rule 18 cuts off the connections and these firms are more likely to have to borrow from non-state owned banks. 
Therefore, for firms in regions in which non-state owned banks have great market share, the increase of pressure from 
financing due to loss of political connections is larger, and firms are more likely to increase accounting quality. We find 
evidence consistent with the idea, with OFFICIAL×POST being significantly different between high and low finance 
marketization. 
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4.5 Channel Analysis: Lax Regulation 
Another channel through which political connections may affect accounting quality is lax 
regulation. The regulatory environment and regulatory monitoring are important to motivate firms to 
provide high-quality information (Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003; Hope 2003). However, 
politically connected firms face less strict regulation. For example, Correia (2014) finds that 
politically connected firms in U.S. are less likely to be inspected by the SEC, and if those firms are 
prosecuted, the penalties are lower. Yu and Yu (2011) conclude that for firms under class-action 
lawsuits, those with political connections have longer class-action periods, consistent with such 
connections delaying the detection of fraud. Lu, Pan, and Zhang (2015) show that Chinese courts 
deliberately favor SOE firms and firms with political ties, suggesting that politically connected firms 
face a lax regulatory environment. The regulator imposes a variety of rules to promote the transparent 
disclosure of important information and to penalize accounting fraud. However, political connections 
may shield firms from the regulation mechanism and therefore they have less incentive to supply 
high-quality financial reports. After the political connections are cut off, the regulatory environment 
becomes stricter for those firms, and they are motivated to increase their accounting quality. 
 We first use a within-China region-level variable that measures the efficiency of courts in 
enforcing contracts.32 Although laws and regulations are set at the national level, the efficiency of 
courts varies significantly across regions.33 The World Bank developed the index by following a 
                                                 
32 See “Doing Business in China” report at http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reports/Subnational-Reports/China. The data are 
collected through a study of the civil-procedure codes and other court regulations as well as surveys completed by local 
litigation lawyers. 
33 In regions characterized as having low judiciary efficiency, such as Jilin (average time for court case: 540 days), the risk 
of lawsuits is low, not only for connected firms but for all firms. Thus, political connections do not matter (or matter much 
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commercial dispute through local courts.34 In regions with low efficiency of courts, the time cost and 
monetary cost of going to courts are higher, therefore firms face lower legal threats and political 
connections likely do not provide as large benefits. In contrast, for firms in regions with high 
efficiency of courts, the legal threat is stronger and political connections can provide greater benefits. 
We expect that political connections will affect accounting quality to a larger extent in regions with 
higher judiciary efficiency, where firms face a stronger legal threat after losing political connections.  
Second, we use firm size as a conditioning variable. Previous literature suggests that small firms 
lose more when facing lawsuits because of higher financing costs and greater reliance on external 
counsel (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004; Lanjouw and Lerner 2001). Also, large firms are under 
greater media scrutiny and the connected official may be reluctant to or find it difficult to protect the 
firms (Watts and Zimmerman 1983). Therefore, small firms are likely to benefit more from political 
connections related to regulation.35 
In Panel A of Table 5, we divide our sample based on the judicial-efficiency ranking, and in 
Panel B based on firm size. Consistent with our prediction, we observe that the accounting-quality 
improvement is more significant when the regional judicial efficiency is high and when firms are 
smaller. These results provide us with evidence supporting the lax-regulation channel. Political 
connections can provide firms with protection from detection or threat of laws and regulations. Losing 
the connections means stricter regulation, therefore firms affected by Rule 18 improve their 
                                                                                                                                                                      
less). 
34 The index combines two indicators: (1) Time, including the number of days from the time the plaintiff files the lawsuit 
in court until the time of payment. This measure includes both the days on which actions take place and the waiting period 
between actions; and (2) costs, including the official cost of going through court procedures, expressed as a percentage of 
the claim value. The costs include court costs, enforcement costs, and attorney fees. 
35 We acknowledge that firm size can also proxy for other factors. This is why we do not rely solely on this empirical proxy.  
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accounting quality. 
In summary, we find significant evidence supporting both the financing-pressure and the lax-
regulation channels. The mechanism analyses reveal how political connections can impact accounting 
quality, which helps us better understand the relation between political connections and accounting 
quality. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1 Personal Characteristics of Directors 
In Panel C of Table 2 we provide descriptive statistics on personal characteristics of the directors 
who were forced to resign. We manually collect these data.36 We observe that 40% of the resigned 
directors held government positions that meant they had particular power in the industry in which the 
firm operates,37 36% held “national rank” (an important dimension in China), most of the resigned 
directors (87%) reside within the same province as the resigned director, the vast majority (89%) are 
male, and 20% are retired. 
In Table 6, we include these personal characteristic as additional controls (in the specification with 
industry fixed effects). Column 1 shows that the estimated coefficient on 𝑶𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑨𝑳𝒊 × 𝑷𝑶𝑺𝑻𝒊𝒕 is -
0.0207 with a t-statistic of -5.61. Thus we find that no conclusions are altered after controlling for 
                                                 
36 We collect resignation reports from http://www.cninfo.com.cn/cninfo-new/index. Then we scrutinize the corresponding 
CVs from CSMAR and supplement with information from companies’ home pages or other websites. For the successor 
directors, we first compare the directors’ names for each treated firm between years. After identifying the incoming 
directors, we read through their CVs (again from CSMAR database and supplemented with information from companies’ 
home pages and other websites). 
37 As an example, if a real-estate development company hires an official director from People's Republic of China Ministry 
of Housing, which has the authority to monitor the operations of the real-estate industry, this official has some power 
related to the real-estate industry. 
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detailed personal characteristics of the outgoing directors. 
Next we collect data on the replacement directors. Most firms replace the resigned directors in a 
timely fashion. Panel D of Table 2 shows the details of the successor directors’ backgrounds. Of the 
incoming directors without political connections, 30% have their primary experience within the same 
industry. In terms of professional backgrounds, 54% are from accounting and finance, 15% from law, 
and 6% from banking. With regard to personal characteristics, 83% are male and under 5% are retired.  
Again, we include these as additional controls and no inferences are impacted (Column 2).38 
Finally, in Column 3 we include both all resigned director characteristics and successor director 
characteristics and again we reach the same conclusion (test coefficient of -0.0206 with a t-statistic of 
-5.59). 
 
5.2 Falsification Tests: Directors with No or Limited Political Connections 
In this section, we execute a series of additional tests to provide corroborating evidence. First, to 
validate that the change of accounting quality is caused by political connections, we examine the 
effect of the resignation of directors with official ranks but who are highly unlikely to provide 
important political connections. If our results are not driven by political connections, then we expect 
that the resignation of these directors will also affect the accounting quality. We use firms with 
resigned directors from universities, publicly-funded organizations, or SOEs as the treated group. We 
have a total of 267 pseudo-treatment firms, among which 173 firms with resigned directors from 
universities, 61 with resigned directors from publicly-funded organizations, and 33 with resigned 
                                                 
38 For example, our results are not driven by having incoming directors with accounting expertise. 
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directors from other SOEs.39 We use a similar PSM procedure and match these firms with control 
firms using the firm characteristics in the year before Rule 18. We define NOFFICIAL as a binary 
variable that equals 1 if the firm has resigned director from universities, publicly-funded organizations, 
or SOEs, and 0 otherwise. We then execute similar DiD analyses as in equation (1) and present the 
results in Table 7. The results show that NOFFICIAL×POST is not significant. This test further 
corroborates that our results are driven by political connections. 
 
5.3 Potential Confounding Events 
We consider two potential confounding events that occurred around the event we examine. After 
President Xi Jinping assumed power in the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
the government launched a large-scale anti-corruption campaign, and the Eight-Point Regulation was 
issued on December 4, 2012.40 The regulation requires government officials to forego conspicuous 
perks, and was perceived as the launch of China’s anti-corruption reform. The Eight-Point Regulation 
regulates the general behavior of government officials, while Rule 18 specifically focuses on the 
officials who serve as directors in firms. Lin, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2016) find that the market 
reacts positively to the launch of the Eight-Point Regulation, and firms (especially SOE firms) greatly 
reduce their entertainment and travel costs (ETC), which are presumably used for corruption. Griffin 
et al. (2016) confirm that the Regulation leads to a decrease in entertainment expenses, but find no 
evidence that it affects discretionary accruals, one of their measures for corruption. To control the 
                                                 
39  The relevant regulation requires that at least one of the independent directors should have accounting expertise. 
Therefore, it is a common practice that university professors who have accounting backgrounds serve as independent 
directors. 
40 For details, see http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2012-12/05/content_15991171.htm. 
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effects of abrupt change of ETC due to the Eight-Point Regulation, we add ETC as a control variable 
and rerun our main tests as in equation (1). The results are presented in Table 8, models (1) and (2). 
We find that controlling for ETC does not change our conclusion that the curtailing of political 
connections increases accounting quality.41 To further ensure our results are not driven by the Eight-
Point Regulation, we also exclude the year 2012 from our sample, which makes our sample years all 
post the Eight-Point Regulation. The results are presented in columns (3) and (4) in Table 8 and again 
no inferences are affected. 
The second potential confounding event we consider is a market-liberalization reform, the 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, which significantly changed the market segmentation in China. 
Through a centralized platform set up by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, international investors, either institutional or non-institutional investors, can directly trade a 
selected batch of stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock market if they have stock accounts in Hong 
Kong.42 The market-liberalization reform introduces foreign investors and could affect accounting 
quality (e.g., Leuz, Lins, and Warnock 2010). To control for the effects of the market liberalization, 
we first include an indicator variable, which equals one if the stocks can be directly traded by Hong 
Kong and international investors after the reform. The conclusions do not change. 43  Next, we 
eliminate the year 2015 from our sample, which makes our sample years all before the liberalization 
                                                 
41 In an untabulated analysis we further include the interaction term ETC×POST and no inferences are affected. 
42 The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect was announced in November 17, 2014, with 568 stocks included in the 
program. Before the reform, A-shares could only be traded by mainland Chinese nationals, except for Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII). QFIIs have been allowed to trade A-share since 2002. However, there are strict quota limits 
for QFII.  
43 In an untabulated analysis we further include the interaction term Market-Liberalization×POST and no inferences are 
affected. 
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reform. Our inferences hold again. The results are presented in Table 9. 
 
5.4 Placebo Analysis 
Next we implement a placebo analysis. To address the possibility that unobservable shocks that 
are unrelated to Rule 18 could drive the results, we artificially pick the years 2010 and 2011 as the 
post-event period, and 2008 and 2009 as the pre-event period. We do not find a significant difference 
in the accounting quality between the treatment and control firms around these “pseudo-event” years. 
The results are shown in Table 10.44 
 
5.5 Alternative Proxies for Accounting Quality 
In our tabulated analyses we employ the Kothari et al.’s (2005) accruals model to measure 
accounting quality. As Keung and Shih (2014) suggest, performance-adjusted accruals models may 
introduce systematic biases. To mitigate potential bias produced by a specific type of accruals model, 
in untabulated analyses we alternatively use Jones (1991) and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) 
and inferences remain intact. Finally, we employ a model-free proxy that has been widely used in 
China research – below-the-line items (e.g., Hou et al. 2015; Gul, Wu, and Yang 2013; Haw, Qi, Wu, 
and Wu 2005; Chen and Yuan 2004).45  Again, we find consistent results and conclude that our 
inferences are not driven by bias related to a particular accounting-quality proxy. 
                                                 
44 We also use 2010 and 2011 as the pre-event period, and 2012 and 2013 as the post-event period. We do not find 
significant results for these pseudo-event years. Since President Xi took the office in 2012, the results suggest that the 
increase of accounting quality after Rule 18 cannot be attributed to a Xi’s effect. 
45 Following prior literature, this measure is computed as below-the-line items scaled by total sales. We also employ an 
industry-adjusted version of this proxy following Chen and Yuan (2004) and find consistent results. 
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6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we examine the effects of politically connected directors on accounting quality and 
shed light on the channels of the effects. We utilize a natural experiment in China, in which more than 
400 official directors were mandated to resign, effectively severing the political connections of those 
firms. We examine accounting quality in the pre- and post- event periods using a difference-in-
differences approach combined with propensity-score matching and firm fixed effects. Our results 
indicate that compared to control firms, the accounting quality of firms with politically connected 
directors increases after those directors resign. Also, the effect of political connection on accounting 
quality is stronger for non-SOE firms than that for SOE firms. The results are consistent with the idea 
that politically connected directors negatively affect accounting quality. 
We further examine two channels through which political connections affect accounting quality. 
We find that the impact of such connections on accounting quality is through lower financing pressure 
and lax regulation. Because political connections provide preferential access to financing and lax 
regulation, those firms face less financing pressure and less strict regulation, and therefore provide 
lower quality of financial information. Our paper contributes to the understanding of the effects of 
China’s anti-corruption campaign in general and to research on the effects of political connections on 
accounting quality in particular.  
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APPENDIX A 
Procedure to Construct the Propensity-Score-Matched Sample 
 
The PSM approach involves paring treatment and comparison units that are similar in terms of their 
observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). We implement this procedure by first estimating 
a logit regression to model the probability of being affected by Rule 18 (i.e., firms with resigned 
official directors). We use all of the control variables in equation (1) as our predictors. Next, we 
estimate the propensity score for each firm using the predicted probabilities from the logit model. We 
then match each treatment firm to the control firm using nearest neighborhood technique with no 
replacement. The estimation result for our logit regression is as follows (with a Likelihood Ratio Chi-
Squared of 47.49): 
Dependent Variable = Resigned Official Directors 
VARIABLES Coefficient Z 
SIZE 0.171 1.351 
LEV -0.593 -1.377 
MB -0.045 -0.863 
PPE 0.204 0.424 
SOE 0.013 0.079 
AGE 0.396* 1.811 
CYCLE -3.541 -1.002 
ANALYSTS -0.018 -0.208 
INSIDER -0.009 -0.017 
BOARDSIZE 0.843** 2.152 
INDPRO 2.274* 1.718 
ROA -2.606 -1.342 
LOSS -0.340 -1.059 
SDSALE 0.812* 1.695 
GROWTH -0.011 -0.090 
RETURN 0.001 0.003 
DIVIDEND 0.085 0.448 
BIG4 0.024 0.083 
AF 0.055 0.327 
BETA 0.385 1.253 
MI -0.066* -1.876 
Constant -9.993*** -4.194 
Industry Fixed Effects                YES 
Observations               1,932 
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APPENDIX B 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variables  Definitions 
|DA| The absolute value of abnormal discretionary accrual, calculated using the 
performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al. 2005);  
OFFICIAL Indicator variable for official director, equal to 1 if the firm has resigned 
official directors due to Rule 18, and 0 otherwise; 
POST Indicator variable for post-policy period, equal to 1 if it is year 2014 or 2015, 
and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE Firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization 
at the year end; 
LEV Financial Leverage, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets; 
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market capitalization of 
equity divided by the book value of equity at the year end; 
PPE Fixed assets, calculated as Property, Plant and Equity divided by total assets; 
SOE Indicate variable for state-owned enterprise, equal to 1 if the ultimate 
controller is the state, and 0 otherwise; 
AGE Firm age, calculated as the natural logarithm of years that the firm has listed; 
CYCLE Operating cycle, calculated as the sum of the number of days receivables and 
days inventory. Days receivable is calculated as (360*Average accounts 
receivables/Sales), Days inventory is calculated as (360*Average 
Inventory/Sales). We scale the variable by 10000 for exposition; 
ANALYSTS Number of analyst following, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts following the firm; 
INSIDER Insider shareholding, calculated as shares held by managers divided by total 
shares outstanding; 
BOARDSIZE Board size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of board 
directors; 
INDPRO The percentage of independent directors, calculated as the number of 
independent directors as a percentage of total board directors; 
ROA Return on asset, calculated as net income before extraordinary items divided 
by the average total asset; 
LOSS Indicator variable for loss, equal to 1 if the firm report negative net income, 
and 0 otherwise; 
SDSALE The standard deviation of sales, calculate as the standard deviation of sales 
(deflated by total assets) in the previous five years. We require at least three 
observations to estimate the variable; 
GROWTH Growth rate, calculated as the sales in the current year divided by the sales in 
the last year, minus one; 
RETURN Stock return, represents the annual stock return of the firm; 
DIVIDEND Indicator variable for dividend payment, equal to 1 if the firm pays dividend, 
and 0 otherwise; 
BIG4 Indicator variable for Big-4 auditor, equal to 1 if the firm is audited by the 
Big-4 auditors, and 0 otherwise; 
AF Audit fee, calculated as the natural logarithm of audit fee paid to the auditor; 
BETA Beta of the stock, obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database; 
MI Marketization index for each province or provincial level region in China, 
achieved from Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011). 
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TABLE 1: Sample Selection 
 
This table describes the sample selection process. For the number of resigned directors, when a person 
serves as director for two firms, we count as two. 
 
  Number of Firms 
Number of Resigned 
Directors 
All firms listed on the Main and SME Boards of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen A-share stock exchanges 2136 8610 
Non-financial firms  2090 8337 
Firms with resigned directors due to Rule18 613 819 
Excluding firms with resigned directors from 
universities, publically funded organizations, or 
SOEs 298 418 
Firms with resigned official directors 315 401 
    Excluding firms with missing variables or no PSM 
control firms 23 24 
Treated firms in our sample 292 377 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Comparison between treated firms and control firms 
 Treatment Group 
 Non-Treatment 
Group (No-PSM) 
Treatment-Non-
Treatment 
(No PSM) 
Control Group 
(With PSM) 
Treatment-
Control 
(With PSM) 
VARIABLES N mean N mean Difference N mean Difference 
|DA| 292 0.055 1,640 0.054 0.001 292 0.049 0.006 
SIZE 292 22.923 1,640 22.690 0.233*** 292 22.916 0.007 
LEV 292 0.492 1,640 0.477 0.015 292 0.479 0.013 
MB 292 2.102 1,640 2.328 -0.226* 292 2.172 -0.070 
PPE 292 0.257 1,640 0.242 0.015 292 0.237 0.020 
SOE 292 0.548 1,640 0.474 0.074** 292 0.562 -0.014 
AGE 292 2.786 1,640 2.742 0.044* 292 2.771 0.015 
CYCLE 292 0.021 1,640 0.023 -0.002 292 0.021 0.000 
ANALYSTS 292 2.076 1,640 1.986 0.090 292 2.082 -0.006 
INSIDER 292 0.066 1,640 0.082 -0.016 292 0.061 0.005 
BOARDSIZE 292 2.201 1,640 2.164 0.037*** 292 2.208 -0.007 
INDPRO 292 0.375 1,640 0.371 0.004 292 0.376 -0.001 
ROA 292 0.035 1,640 0.037 -0.002 292 0.040 -0.005 
LOSS 292 0.086 1,640 0.103 -0.017 292 0.062 0.024 
SDSALE 292 0.143 1,640 0.131 0.012 292 0.136 0.007 
GROWTH 292 0.176 1,640 0.179 -0.003 292 0.150 0.026 
RETURN 292 0.186 1,640 0.215 -0.029 292 0.199 -0.013 
DIVIDEND 292 0.733 1,640 0.704 0.029 292 0.767 -0.034 
BIG4 292 0.086 1,640 0.061 0.025 292 0.106 -0.020 
AF 292 13.832 1,640 13.687 0.145*** 292 13.871 -0.039 
BETA 292 1.046 1,640 1.023 0.023 292 1.041 0.005 
MI 292 8.877 1,640 9.148 -0.271** 292 8.939 -0.062 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Treatment firms with propensity-score matched firms as control samples 
 
VARIABLES N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
|DA| 2,204  0.051 0.051 0.017 0.037 0.067 
SIZE 2,204  23.118 1.149 22.292 22.938 23.795 
LEV 2,204  0.484 0.207 0.324 0.495 0.647 
MB 2,204  2.486 2.053 1.359 1.844 2.778 
PPE 2,204  0.247 0.179 0.109 0.201 0.359 
SOE 2,204  0.559 0.497 0 1 1 
AGE 2,204  2.808 0.336 2.639 2.833 3.045 
CYCLE 2,204  0.023 0.030 0.007 0.013 0.024 
ANALYSTS 2,204  2.074 1.122 1.099 2.303 2.996 
INSIDER 2,204  0.059 0.140 0 0 0.009 
BOARDSIZE 2,204  2.192 0.207 2.079 2.197 2.303 
INDPRO 2,204  0.375 0.055 0.333 0.364 0.400 
ROA 2,204  0.035 0.052 0.011 0.028 0.057 
LOSS 2,204  0.104 0.305 0 0 0 
SDSALE 2,204  0.136 0.143 0.053 0.091 0.161 
GROWTH 2,204  0.119 0.472 -0.068 0.054 0.192 
RETURN 2,204  0.316 0.491 -0.030 0.217 0.540 
DIVIDEND 2,204  0.578 0.494 0 1 1 
BIG4 2,204  0.096 0.294 0 0 0 
AF 2,204  13.892 0.777 13.353 13.710 14.221 
BETA 2,204  1.066 0.245 0.908 1.083 1.233 
MI 2,204  8.903 1.989 7.390 8.930 10.420 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel C: Resigned Director Backgrounds 
 
 Number Percentage 
In charge of related industry 161 40.15% 
National level rank 146 36.41% 
Company registered within the 
jurisdiction of the official  
348 86.78% 
Male directors 356 88.78% 
Retired 81 20.20% 
Total 401 100% 
  
 
 
 
Panel D: Successor Director Backgrounds 
 
 Number Percentage 
From same industry 120 30.08% 
Accounting, finance or tax  215 53.88% 
Banking 24 6.02% 
Law 60 15.04% 
At least belong to one of these 
categories 
363 90.98% 
Male directors 332 83.21% 
Retired 18 4.51% 
Total 399 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 45 
 
TABLE 3: Political Connections and Discretionary Accruals 
 
This table reports our main results of the impact of political connections on absolute 
discretionary accruals. The model is as follows: 
|DA|𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽10𝐶𝑌𝐶𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝑆𝐷𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽21𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽24𝐺𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        
The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from Kothari et 
al. (2005). Model (1) and (2) present full sample regressions, model (3) and (4) present PSM 
regressions, Model (5) and (6) present PSM regressions for non-SOE firms and SOE firms 
respectively. The whole PSM sample includes 2204 observations from 584 firms, including 
treatment firms and control firms, in the pre and post periods. Please see Appendix B for variable 
definitions. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Full PSM Sample Non-SOE SOE 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0135*** -0.0130*** -0.0198*** -0.0199*** -0.0297*** -0.0112*** 
 (-4.96) (-4.51) (-5.62) (-5.61) (-5.08) (-2.63) 
     (Diff: Z value=2.55**) 
POST 0.0017 0.0018 0.0027 0.0023 0.0221* -0.0129 
 (0.75) (0.53) (0.62) (0.27) (1.70) (-1.13) 
OFFICIAL 0.0058**  0.0086***    
 (2.42)  (2.98)    
SIZE -0.0014 0.0114*** 0.0004 0.0139** 0.0063 0.0208* 
 (-1.13) (2.81) (0.21) (1.96) (0.69) (1.86) 
LEV 0.0328*** 0.0498*** 0.0252*** 0.0422** 0.0601** 0.0118 
 (7.27) (4.51) (3.10) (1.98) (2.20) (0.38) 
MB 0.0007* -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0043 
 (1.79) (-1.23) (0.72) (-0.35) (0.06) (-1.55) 
PPE -0.0240*** -0.0469*** -0.0219** -0.0568** -0.1007*** -0.0137 
 (-4.92) (-3.59) (-2.52) (-2.27) (-2.72) (-0.39) 
SOE -0.0037** 0.0103 -0.0036 -0.0093   
 (-2.22) (1.18) (-1.08) (-0.92)   
AGE -0.0006 -0.0283 0.0038 -0.0312 -0.0522 -0.0193 
 (-0.29) (-1.48) (0.98) (-0.94) (-1.12) (-0.44) 
CYCLE 0.0648* 0.0305 0.1703** 0.1407 0.0028 0.3818 
 (1.81) (0.35) (2.05) (0.78) (0.02) (1.27) 
ANALYSTS -0.0027*** -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0017 -0.0040 
 (-3.28) (-1.19) (-1.11) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-1.05) 
INSIDER -0.0041 -0.0126 0.0041 0.0335 0.0507* -0.4533*** 
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 (-0.89) (-0.81) (0.38) (1.17) (1.84) (-4.40) 
BOARDSIZE -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0010 -0.0050 0.0157 -0.0234 
 (-0.83) (-0.49) (-0.16) (-0.33) (0.64) (-1.22) 
INDPRO 0.0118 0.0279 0.0028 0.0308 0.1450** -0.0162 
 (0.85) (1.18) (0.12) (0.90) (2.50) (-0.41) 
ROA 0.1317*** 0.1606*** 0.1194*** 0.0552 0.1424** 0.0201 
 (6.22) (4.75) (3.24) (1.08) (2.20) (0.23) 
LOSS 0.0129*** 0.0148*** 0.0161*** 0.0093* 0.0251*** 0.0028 
 (5.18) (4.72) (3.43) (1.78) (2.66) (0.43) 
SDSALE 0.0489*** 0.0178 0.0527*** 0.0127 0.0275 -0.0073 
 (7.45) (1.42) (5.06) (0.69) (1.18) (-0.24) 
GROWTH 0.0147*** 0.0107*** 0.0184*** 0.0116** 0.0052 0.0195*** 
 (7.44) (4.52) (4.29) (2.23) (0.74) (2.71) 
RETURN 0.0016 -0.0012 0.0040 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0048 
 (1.03) (-0.68) (1.42) (0.40) (-0.05) (1.24) 
DIVIDEND -0.0027 0.0008 -0.0081** -0.0050 -0.0074 -0.0062 
 (-1.52) (0.40) (-2.36) (-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.10) 
BIG4 0.0009 0.0010 0.0017 0.0031 0.0348** -0.0152 
 (0.31) (0.09) (0.40) (0.19) (2.41) (-0.57) 
AF -0.0035** -0.0007 -0.0056** -0.0045 -0.0022 -0.0040 
 (-2.22) (-0.19) (-2.13) (-0.79) (-0.25) (-0.60) 
BETA -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0052 0.0019 0.0113 -0.0073 
 (-0.92) (-0.74) (-1.06) (0.33) (1.31) (-0.93) 
MI -0.0001  -0.0007    
 (-0.36)  (-1.00)    
Constant 0.1276*** -0.1421 0.1129*** -0.1260 -0.0359 -0.2405 
 (5.26) (-1.37) (2.77) (-0.70) (-0.14) (-0.91) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO NO NO 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 7,492 7,492 2,204 2,204 973 1,231 
Adj. R2 0.131 0.257 0.167 0.293 0.276 0.316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 47 
 
TABLE 4: Lower Financing-Pressure Channel 
 
This table reports the results of lower financing pressure channel analysis. In Panel A, the sample 
firms are partitioned into sub-samples based on the sample median values of the cost of debt 
(COD) in the year before Rule 18. In Panel B, the sample firms are partitioned into sub-samples 
based on the sample median values of foreign capital importation degree compiled by Fan, 
Wang, and Zhu (2011). The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
estimated from the performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al., 2005). Please see Appendix B for 
variable definitions. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Conditional on the Cost of Debt 
VARIABLES High COD Low COD High COD Low COD 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0134** -0.0261*** -0.0134*** -0.0277*** 
 (-2.55) (-5.07) (-2.60) (-5.40) 
 (Diff: Z value=1.72*) (Diff: Z value=1.97**) 
POST 0.0062 0.0019 0.0210* -0.0115 
 (0.99) (0.34) (1.70) (-0.80) 
OFFICIAL 0.0104** 0.0057   
 (2.40) (1.31)   
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 977 993 977 993 
Adj. R2 0.186 0.242 0.266 0.318 
 
Panel B: Conditional on Foreign Capital Importation 
VARIABLES High FCI Low FCI High FCI Low FCI 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0282*** -0.0115** -0.0294*** -0.0089* 
 (-5.14) (-2.51) (-5.26) (-1.89) 
 (Diff: Z value=2.35**) (Diff: Z value=2.80***) 
POST 0.0056 -0.0012 0.0129 -0.0086 
 (0.78) (-0.21) (0.98) (-0.77) 
OFFICIAL 0.0116*** 0.0074*   
 (2.61) (1.88)   
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,031 1,173 1,031 1,173 
Adj. R2 0.206 0.177 0.277 0.315 
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TABLE 5: Lax-Regulation Channel 
 
This table reports the results of the lax regulation channel analysis. In Panel A, the sample firms 
are partitioned into sub-samples based on the sample median values of judicial efficiency 
ranking developed by Word Bank in Doing Business in China Report. In Panel B, the sample 
firms are partitioned into sub-samples based on the sample median values of firm size in the year 
before Rule 18. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated 
from the performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al. 2005). Please see Appendix B for variable 
definitions. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Conditional on Judiciary Efficiency 
VARIABLES High Judiciary 
Efficiency 
low Judiciary 
Efficiency 
High Judiciary 
Efficiency 
low Judiciary 
Efficiency 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0329*** -0.0123*** -0.0328*** -0.0108** 
 (-5.15) (-2.87) (-5.12) (-2.50) 
 (Diff: Z value=2.67***) (Diff: Z value=2.85***) 
POST 0.0134 -0.0002 0.0241 -0.0146 
 (1.51) (-0.04) (1.64) (-1.36) 
OFFICIAL 0.0118** 0.0059   
 (2.58) (1.57)   
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 777 1,427 777 1,427 
Adj. R2 0.174 0.191 0.240 0.326 
 
Panel B: Conditional on the Cost of Lawsuits 
VARIABLES BIG SMALL BIG SMALL 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0131*** -0.0308*** -0.0122*** -0.0327*** 
 (-3.23) (-4.88) (-3.11) (-5.24) 
 (Diff: Z value=2.36**) (Diff: Z value=2.77***) 
POST -0.0052  0.0028 0.0066 
 (-1.28)  (0.26) (0.46) 
OFFICIAL 0.0081** 0.0104**   
 (2.07) (2.35)   
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES NO NO 
Firm FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,288 916 1,288 916 
Adj. R2 0.192 0.201 0.292 0.323 
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TABLE 6: Controls for Personal Characteristics of Resigned and Incoming Directors 
 
This table reports results of regressions that are similar to Column 3 of Table 3 but with controls 
for personal characteristics of resigned and incoming directors added. Please see Appendix B for 
variable definitions. The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES Resigned Incoming Resigned and 
Incoming 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0207*** -0.0206*** -0.0206*** 
 (-5.61) (-5.59) (-5.59) 
INDUM 0.0020  0.0025 
 (0.50)  (0.63) 
RANK 0.0029  0.0032 
 (0.77)  (0.85) 
INREGION -0.0095  -0.0100 
 (-1.45)  (-1.52) 
MALE -0.0018  -0.0017 
 (-0.32)  (-0.32) 
RETIRED 0.0008  0.0015 
 (0.19)  (0.35) 
INDUM_EXPT  -0.0043 -0.0051 
  (-1.17) (-1.33) 
ACC_EXPT  0.0038 0.0043 
  (1.08) (1.24) 
BANK  -0.0060 -0.0047 
  (-1.19) (-0.90) 
LAWYER  0.0020 0.0027 
  (0.44) (0.60) 
POST 0.0034 0.0028 0.0032 
 (0.74) (0.62) (0.71) 
OFFICIAL 0.0168** 0.0087** 0.0160** 
 (2.17) (2.34) (2.00) 
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Year & Industry FE YES YES YES 
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 
Adj. R2 0.177 0.176 0.178 
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TABLE 7: The Effects of Non-Official Directors’ Resignations 
 
In this table, we use firms with resigned directors from universities, publicly-funded 
organizations or SOEs as treated group. We define NOFFICIAL as an indicator variable which 
equals to 1 if the firm has resigned director from non-government organizations and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the 
performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al. 2005). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. 
The p-values are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
NOFFICIAL×POST 0.0028 0.0029 
 (0.65) (0.69) 
POST 0.0049 0.0025 
 (1.35) (0.24) 
NOFFICIAL -0.0022  
 (-0.68)  
Other Controls Included Included 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO 
Firm FE NO YES 
Observations 2,000 2,000 
Adj. R2 0.148 0.270 
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TABLE 8: Potential Confounding Events -- Eight-Point Regulation  
  
This table presents regression results after controlling for the potential confounding effects of the 
Eight-Point Regulation. In Model (1) and (2), we add Entertainment and Traveling Costs (ETC) 
as a control variable. In Model (3) and (4), we exclude observations of the year 2012 from our 
sample to assure that our sample is after the Eight-point Regulation. The dependent variable is 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the performance-adjusted model 
(Kothari et al. 2005). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. The p-values are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0206*** -0.0205*** -0.0173*** -0.0179*** 
 (-5.61) (-5.54) (-3.96) (-4.19) 
ETC -0.0326 -0.0817   
 (-0.79) (-0.81)   
POST 0.0024 0.0056 0.0002 -0.0087 
 (0.53) (0.61) (0.04) (-0.94) 
OFFICIAL 0.0092***  0.0059  
 (3.04)  (1.47)  
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 2,202 2,202 1,663 1,663 
Adj. R2 0.176 0.298 0.197 0.347 
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TABLE 9: Potential Confounding Events—Market Liberalization 
 
This table reports the regression results controlling the confounding effect of market 
liberalization. In model (1) and (2), we include an indicator variable equal to one if the stocks are 
opened to direct trade by Hong Kong and international investors after the liberalization reform. 
In model (3) and (4) we exclude observations in the year 2015 from our sample to assure that our 
sample is prior to the Market Liberalization. The dependent variable is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals estimated from the performance-adjusted model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. The p-values are based on standard errors 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively.  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0208*** -0.0206*** -0.0171*** -0.0155*** 
 (-5.60) (-5.51) (-3.97) (-3.73) 
Market Liberalization -0.0039 -0.0001   
 (-0.76) (-0.01)   
POST 0.0044 0.0055   
 (0.85) (0.59)   
OFFICIAL 0.0091***  0.0092***  
 (3.02)  (3.05)  
Other Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO YES NO 
Firm FE NO YES NO YES 
Observations 2,204 2,204 1,676 1,676 
Adj. R2 0.175 0.296 0.165 0.312 
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TABLE 10: Placebo Analysis 
 
This table presents the results of a placebo test. To run a pseudo test, we artificially pick 2010 
and 2011 as post event year, while 2008 and 2009 as pre-event year. The dependent variable is 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the performance-adjusted model 
(Kothari et al. 2005). Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. The p-values are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0023 0.0004 
 (-0.40) (0.08) 
POST -0.0047 0.0070 
 (-0.96) (0.64) 
OFFICIAL 0.0035  
 (0.83)  
Other Controls Included Included 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO 
Firm FE NO YES 
Observations 1,577 1,577 
Adj. R2 0.160 0.220 
 
 
 
